An excerpt from Dallas Willard’s History of Ethics to 1900 syllabus, Spring 2011, University of Southern California, Philosophy 442.
The first Book of The Republic (Steph. 327–354) usually strikes the contemporary student as quite puzzling. A number of personalities are introduced whom we today rarely have any sense at all of their significance. They all meant something to the Athenian reader, at least, because of the actual history of Athens. And they represent positions on the primary issue of The Republic—Who is the really good person (like Socrates)? And which is the really good city (like Socrates wanted Athens to be)? The arguments Socrates brings to bear against those positions seem thin and forced, at least in some cases, and the connection of the end of Book I (Thrasymachus shown wrong about whether the just or unjust person is better off) with the beginning of Book II (the Gyges myth) is not transparent. Book I actually constitutes one of the “search” dialogues, which seem to not get us anywhere. (See Socrates’s admission at 354c.) But this is so only for the superficial or uninformed reader. Anyone will be greatly helped with Book I by reading H. W. B. Joseph’s treatment on it in his collection, Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy,1 and perhaps the first fifty pages of Julia Annas’s An Introduction to Plato’s Republic.2 Chapter I of A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work,3 is also extremely helpful in setting the real-life context of Plato’s work.
There are three sources of “moral enlightenment,” as we might say, that are firmly (if not brutally) set aside in The Republic, Book I.
A. Cephalus represents the successful, socially respected individual, who actually thinks there is some connection between wealth and doing the right thing (being “just”) (330d–331b). The most useful purpose of wealth, he says, is that it helps you avoid intentional wrongdoing (331b).
Here the dialogue takes philosophical flight as Socrates replies: “Beautifully put, Cephalus. But speaking of justice (dikaiosune), do you really think it’s as simple as telling the truth and returning what you receive, or are both these acts sometimes just and sometimes unjust?” And he goes on to mention the case of returning a weapon to a friend who has gone mad. “No one would say you ought to return it, . . . or tell him the whole truth either” (331c). The phrase “speaking of justice” signals that we are not going to deal with justice itself, with what justice is.
Two things immediately emerge here that are central to Plato’s understanding of thought:
That concludes Cephalus, the successful, respected and morally complacent individual, to whom many others still in the cave nevertheless look for moral guidance. (What a day Plato would have had with TV interviews and radio “talk shows”! Also: remember our saying, “If you’re so smart, why aincha rich?”)
B. Polemarchus represents divine inspiration mediated through cultural authority. In short, religion. He introduces the word of “the wise and godlike Simonides” (331e), an inspired poet, to the effect “that it’s just to give ‘each his due’” (ibid.). But this requires clarification of what “due” is, and to whom, and under what conditions (332–336a). In particular, “due” seems to mean that it is just to harm one’s enemies as well as help one’s friends. But justice, Socrates argues, cannot harm. For to harm is to make unjust (less well off) (335a–336a). Nothing produces its opposite.
C. Thrasymachus represents cleverness and power. The just is whatever one can get away with. And the just person is the one who can get away with the most, be most powerful (336b and following). This is the “boss,” and politically the “ruler.” Justice is actually what most people (stupid idiots) call “injustice.” This is the person who is really well off, the only sense of “really good” that matters (see 344c–d and 345a–b). So Socrates sets out to show that the unjust life is not superior to the just (347e). This leads to a discussion of skill, function, virtue and soul with which Book I concludes. Socrates attempts to prove that the unjust person (the one who can get away with anything) is not better off, “as a human being,” than the just one.
Some criticisms of Plato’s ethical theory:
For further critical issues, see T. Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory, chap. VIII; and J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, chap. XIII.5
The resources on this website are available to you absolutely free because of the generosity of our supporters. Click the donate button if you'd like to join us in helping people live more fully in the Kingdom of God here and now. All contributions are tax deductible. Thank you!
Dallas Willard Ministries is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.com.
H. W. B. Joseph, Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935).
Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (London: Methuen, 1926), chap. 1.
David Sachs, “A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic,” Philosophical Review 72, no. 2 (1963): 141–58.
Terence Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), chap. 8; Annas, Introduction to Plato’s Republic, chap. 13.