Dallas has the privilege of presenting two talks at a March 2002 Veritas Forum held at Stanford University:
● Nietzsche vs. Jesus Christ: Who Holds the True Path?
● Why Science and Religion Must Conflict
Responding to Stephen Jay Gould’s 1999 publication of Rocks of Ages, Dallas explores the relationship between science and faith. Contrary to Gould’s theory that science and faith represent non-overlapping magisteria, Willard argues that science and faith both deal with human life, but they try to explain it in light of different considerations. Because of this, science and faith will experience some tension, though not insurmountable.
For reference:
1. Non-overlapping magisteria (NOMA) is the view, advocated by Stephen Jay Gould, that science and religion each represent different areas of inquiry, fact vs. values, so there is a difference between the "nets" over which they have "a legitimate magisterium, or domain of teaching authority," and the two domains do not overlap. He suggests, with examples, that "NOMA enjoys strong and fully explicit support, even from the primary cultural stereotypes of hard-line traditionalism" and that it is "a sound position of general consensus, established by long struggle among people of goodwill in both magisteria." In his book Rocks of Ages (1999), Gould put forward what he described as "a blessedly simple and entirely conventional resolution to ... the supposed conflict between science and religion."
2. The fact–value distinction is a fundamental epistemological distinction described between:
- 'Statements of fact' ('positive' or 'descriptive statements'), based upon reason and physical observation, and which are examined via the empirical method.
- 'Statements of value' ('normative' or 'prescriptive statements'), which encompass ethics and aesthetics, and are studied via axiology.
This barrier between 'fact' and 'value' implies it is impossible to derive ethical claims from factual arguments, or to defend the former using the latter.
The fact–value distinction is closely related to, and derived from, the is–ought problem in moral philosophy, characterized by David Hume (1711–1776). The terms are often used interchangeably, though philosophical discourse concerning the is–ought problem does not usually encompass aesthetics.